

Rift Valley Fever – Vector Reservoirs, Inter-epidemic maintenances of the virus

RVF Workshop – An integrated Approach to Controlling Rift Valley Fever (RVF) in Africa and the Middle East. Jan 27th - 29th Cairo, Egypt.


DR. ROSEMARY SANG (KEMRI & USAMRU- Kenya)





RVF, Introduction


- Mosquito-borne disease caused by a Phelebovirus, Bunyaviridae family
- Affects wide range of mammals man and domestic livestock
- Epidemics prone disease, impacting human/animal health
- Devastating economic and social consequences.



Epidemic Transmission Cycle



"dambo" with TOI eggs




2. Large mosquito populations
OTHER ROUTES: Contact with infected animal blood, tissue & milk

RVF – vector species diversity

Genera:
Aedes
Culex,,
mansonia
Amblyomma
variegatum
Culicoides.

- RVFV isolated from wide range of vector species
- Experimentally, a wide variety of species can transmit RVF
- There is world wide distribution of potential vector of RVFV
- e.g Recent studies in France and Tunisia (2008) found competent vectors




!! Hence likely spread of the virus.



VECTORS IN MAJOR OUTBREAKS

- Kenya 1950/1951 Over 100,000 livestock dead
 Vectors not documented
- Egypt 1977 First Major human involvement
 vectors *Culex pipiens*.
- West Africa 1987 Senegal & Mauritania
 - Irrigation project + heavy rains
 - Vectors Ae. vexans, Ae. Ochraceous, Culex poicilipes
- East Africa/Kenya 1997/98 Kenya, Tanzania, Somalia --.
 - Human and animal catastrophe
 - Entomologic investigations NOT documented
- Saudi/Yemen 2000/2001
 - Vectors Ae. Vexans arabiensis, Cu. tritaeniorhynchus
- East Africa/Kenya 2006/07 Kenya, Tanzania, Somalia
 - Due to earlier detection (than 97/98)
 - Peak timing of extensive entomologic surveillance





INTEREPIDEMIC VECTORS

Previous inter-epidemic surveys Implicated many species as RVF vectors in Kenya

<u>Aedes</u>	<u>Culex</u>	<u>Mansonia</u>	<u>Anopheles</u>
mcintoshi	zombaensis vansomereni	africanus	pharoensis
circumluteolus	theileri antennatus		christyi
dentatus	rubinotus		squamosus



KENYA OUTBREAK 2006/07

- In October/Nov 2006, reports of heavy persistent rains in NEP- Kenya + severe flooding
- On 22nd Dec 2007, outbreak of RVF was declared by GK.
- On 14th Dec GEIS/WRP & KEMRI surveillance team moved to Garissa to asses impact of flooding
- Entomologic survey continued through the outbreak



OBJECTIVES OF RVF OUTBREAK RESPONSE

Laboratory testing of entomologic collections from Garissa, Kilifi, Baringo and Kirinyaga was done:

- To determine and document vector species involved in RVF outbreaks in the diverse ecologies.


<u>Later</u>

- To determine the competence of implicated vectors.
- Determine their host preference.



THE SAMPLES CAME FROM DIVERSE ECOLOGIES IN KENYA
















MOSQUITO COLLECTION

- Mosquitoes sampled using standard CO² baited light traps
- Set overnight around affected homes, villages, animal pens
- Trapped mosquitoes taken in the morning







MOSQUITO IDENTIFICATION

A team effort







TESTING SAMPLES FOR RVF VIRUS

Each species was grouped in pools (up to 25/pool).

Those with blood in gut were set aside for subsequent host ID.

Pools homogenised in medium with serum and antibiotic supplements

RVFV RNA extracted from homogenates

Amplified
RVF confirmed
by sequencing PCR
product

RNA amplified by RT-PCR (using RVF Specific primers)



TESTING - CAPACITY BUILDING









PROCEDURES WITH LAB SAFETY BSL-3





Homogenisation of mosquito pools and virus RNA extraction





PCR LABORATORY








Virus RNA amplification and detection



LAB TEST RESULTS













SPECIES	SITES	TESTED POOLS	% PROPORTION OF COLLECTION	RVF +VE POOLS
Ae. mcintoshi	Garissa	500	42.3	26
Ae. ochraceous	Garissa	450	30.0	23
An. squamosus	Garissa	88	5.9	2
TOTAL		1038	78.2%	51



VIRUS DETECTION IN MOSQUITO SPECEIS FROM KILIFI

Ae. pembaensis	Kilifi	65	23.2	1*
Cx. poicilipes	Kilifi	100	38.6	3
Cx. bitaeniorhynchus	Kilifi	22	8.0	3*
TOTAL		187	69.8	7

*First time detection of RVFV in species



VIRUS DETECTION IN MOSQUITO SPECEIS FROM BARINGO

Cx. quinquefasciatus	Baringo	75	4.0	1
Cx. univittatus	Baringo	8	0.3	1
Ma. uniformis	Baringo	804	66.8	15
Ma. africanus	Baringo	327	20.2	2
TOTAL		1214	91.3	19

INFECTION RATES GARISSA

SITE	RVF+ Sp	IR*	LIMITS	DENSITY
ElHumow	Ae. ochraceous	2.54	1.53 – 3.98	6,192
	Ae. mcintoshi	2.38	1.48 - 3.64	П
	An squamosus	1.11	0.20 – 3.64	и
Kurabul	Ae. mcintoshi	2.0	0.53 – 5.41	178
	Ae. ochraceous	1.97	0.52 – 5.33	ш
Dertu/Shan	Ae. ochraceous	10.65	1.97 – 36.11	30
	Ae. mcintoshi	1.25	0.07 – 6.08	ш
Desai	Ae. ochraceous	1.11	0.20 – 3.63	516
	Ae. mcintoshi	0.83	0.15 – 2.71	ш

Pooled infection rates – Bias corrected maximum likelihood infection rate/1000



INFECTIONS RATES BARINGO AND KILIFI

SITES	RVF + Sp	IR	LIMITS	TOTAL
Logumgum (Baringo)	Cx. Univittatus*	18.01	1.32 – 118.01	5,269
11	Ma. uniformis	0.89	0.52 – 1.44	П
П	Cx. quinqefaciatus	0.71	0.04 – 3.42	и
н	Ma. africana	0.33	0.06 – 1.08	и
Gongoni (Kilifi)	Cx. bitaeniorhyn	6.92	1.84 – 18.94	63
Tezo	Cx. poicilipes	1.28	0.34 – 3.46	ıı .
Uyombo	Ae. pembaensis	0.65	0.04 – 3.17	"



IMPLICATION



Garissa/Baringo

- 77 RVFV isolates, 51 (66%) from Garissa 19 (24.6%) from Baringo.
- Garissa and Baringo reported highest numbers of suspected human cases
- Both pastoralist zones. Livestock are kept in large herds aids virus amplification.
- Both flood prone terrain, & high temperatures
- suited for high mosquito densities, rapid virus growth in vectors (short EIP) and hence higher transmission rates.








DISCUSSION


- This is one of the most comprehensive entomologic survey undertaken in a RVF outbreak in Kenya.
- Attributed to the pre-existing surveillance activities by GEIS&KEMRI
- Findings indicate that different mosquito species serve as epizootic and/or epidemic vectors of RVFV in different ecologic settings in Kenya
- Virus infected species included previously known and new ones
- This presents a complex epidemiologic pattern of RVFV in Kenya
- Any effort to come up with control strategies must put this into account



FIGURE 3. Number of reported Rift Valley fever cases (n = 330), by date of illness onset — Kenya November 2006–January 2007*



^{*} As of January 25, 2007, for cases with known date of onset.



The average number of days between key events

19 Oct

30 Oct

17 Nov

30 Nov

11 Dec

14 Jan

WHO declared human index case

GEIS early warning out EMPRES warning to gov'ts

How effective disease prevention can be achieved? - Stop the transmission!

- 1. Advanced Larviciding will:
 - avoid high vector densities
 - reduce vector infection rates
 - reduce virus transmission & amplification
 - reduce animal exposure <<< human exposure
- 3. Adulticides During outbreak to reduce transmission Too late
- 4. Livestock -insecticide treatment (pour on)?-movement of livestock from vector swarms

SUGGESTIONS



- Vector surveillance necessary in outbreak hotspots/regions during IEP:
 - to facilitate early detection/prevention
 - Identify IEP maintenance mechanism
 - Localise emergence zones (vectors/reservoirs)
- Analysis of blood in fed specimens
 - Extent virus transmission to human by mosquitoes,
 - Identification of other possible reservoirs, the range of other hosts involved.



Acknowledgements



- KEMRI
- USAMRU Kenya GEIS
- CDC Kenya
- CDC Fort Collins
- NAMRU 3
- USAMRIID
- NASA, Godard Earth Science
- USAID
- Kenya's MOPH&S and MOHS + their staff, Garissa, Kilifi, Baringo AND Kirinyaga





AND TO THE PEOPLE





THANK YOU